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German Invasion and Spy Scares in Ireland, 1890s-1914: 
Between Fiction and Fact
Jérôme aan de Wiel
Université de Reims/University College, Cork
Abstract
The impact of so-called invasion novels on Great Britain before the outbreak of the First 
World War in 1914 is well-known. However, it is far less known concerning Ireland. This 
article shows its effects, notably a confusion between fiction and fact which had serious politi-
cal consequences. There was also a definite difference in the situation in both countries before 
the war. Yet, this kind of literature was not totally without foundation.
Keywords: invasion novels, spies, hairdressers, William Le Queux, The Invasion of 1910, 
Erskine Childers, The Riddle of the Sands, services secrets britanniques, Royal Irish Constabu-
lary, Dublin Metropolitan Police, Deuxième Bureau, Irish national press, Irish regional press.
Résumé
L’impact que la littérature dite d’invasion (invasion novel) a eu en Grande-Bretagne avant le 
déclenchement de la Première Guerre mondiale en 1914 est bien connu. Par contre, il est nettement 
moins connu en Irlande. Cet article montre ses effets, notamment une confusion entre la fiction et la 
réalité qui a eu de sérieuses conséquences politiques, et aussi une différence certaine entre la situation 
en Irlande et en Grande-Bretagne avant la guerre. Cependant, cette littérature n’était pas entière-
ment sans fondement.
Mots clé  : littérature d’invasion, espions, coiffeurs, William Le Queux, The Invasion of 1910, 
Erskine Childers, The Riddle of the Sands, services secrets britanniques, Royal Irish Constabulary, 
Dublin Metropolitan Police, Deuxième Bureau, presse nationale irlandaise, presse régionale irlandaise.
The invasion literature that developed at the end of the nineteenth and begin-
ning of the twentieth centuries has been the object of numerous studies as it is 
acknowledged to have added to the increasing tensions between Britain, Germany 
and France leading up to the First World War in 1914. For example, in 1969, the 
French historian Marc Ferro wrote: “Over twenty works in England foresaw the 
British surprised, invaded and defeated […]. Overall this literature reflected the 
nagging worries besetting the country 1.” Twenty-nine years later, the British his-
1.  Marc Ferro, h e Great War (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), i rst published in 1969, see 
Chapter 4 “Imaginary War”, p. 29-30.
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torian Niall Ferguson remarked about invasion novelists: “Writers like William Le 
Queux also played an extremely important role in the creation of Britain’s modern 
intelligence service. An unholy alliance developed between hack writers and mili-
tary careerists […]. In any case, most of the information which Le Queux and his 
associates suspected German spies of trying to obtain was readily available for a 
small price in the form of Ordnance Survey and Admiralty maps 2.” Indeed, it was 
pure fantasy with serious consequences. While the effects of invasion and spy lite-
rature on Britain are well-known, they are far less known regarding Ireland. This 
study will aim to shed light on the situation in Ireland and show that on occasion 
fiction met fact and fact met fiction. The border between literature and reality was 
not always clearly drawn.
Before concentrating on fiction and facts, it is necessary to give a brief outline 
of the international situation between 1870 and the turn of the century. The 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw not only the humiliating defeat of the French 
army by the Prussians but also the political unification of Germany, which, until 
then, had been divided into several states. From then on, it was clear that the 
newly united Germany was on her way to become the strongest military power 
on the continent. As to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, it was 
safely away from the continent, separated by the North Sea, the English Channel 
and the Atlantic Ocean. The British Royal Navy had no serious rival. And yet, 
straight after the Prussian victory over France, a British general called Sir George 
Tomkyns Chesney sensed that Germany would be the power that one day would 
threaten Britain’s very existence. Chesney was much concerned by what he 
deemed was British military and naval unpreparedness to face a foreign invasion. 
To warn public and politicians alike, he published a short book in 1871 entit-
led The Battle of Dorking. Although Germany is not named, the first pages of the 
book leave no doubt that it was her that he had in mind 3.
In 1896, Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German emperor, declared that his country’s 
destiny was on the seas. In 1898, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz began a program to 
develop the German navy and catch up with the Royal Navy. It was the beginning 
of Germany’s Weltpolitik (world policy) and also of the arms race. At first, Britain 
tried to reach an understanding with Germany to limit naval armament. After all, 
the Germans were no colonial rivals unlike the French. But soon, it was clear that 
Anglo-German talks would lead to nowhere. In Britain, public opinion became 
increasingly anti-German all the more since Imperial Germany was also becoming 
a major industrial and commercial rival. The British press spewed its vitriol over 
2.  Niall Ferguson, h e Pity of War (London, Penguin Books, 1999), i rst published in 1998, see paragraphs 
 “Prophets” & “Hacks and Spooks”, p. 12 & p. 14.
3.  George Chesney, h e Battle of Dorking (Kessinger Publishing, 2004), i rst published in 1871.
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the Germans 4. General Chesney and his Battle of Dorking seemed to be vindicated. 
Writers grabbed their pencils and fantasised endlessly about future invasions and 
wars.
The decision of the German government to step up the construction of a 
modern battle fleet triggered off the need to write about the future war between 
Britain and Germany and to portray what would be the consequences for both 
countries. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were about twelve inva-
sion novels published every year 5. By the time the First World War broke out in 
1914, there were about 400 such books 6. Other invasion stories were published 
by the popular press in a serialised form. Invasion gripped the minds of middle 
and working classes alike. There were in fact three main reasons for this literature. 
Firstly, the writers tried to guess what the Germans were up to. Secondly, there 
was the desire to make the British government want to increase military spending. 
And thirdly, this was the age of anticipation and imagining what the future would 
be. To quote Professor I. F. Clarke: “The tales of the war-to-come were part of, 
and had their special roles in, the great forward movement of the imagination that 
began about 1870 7…”
The most successful of all the invasion sensationalists was without any shadow 
of a doubt the Englishman William Le Queux. In 1906, he published The Inva-
sion of 1910 with the help of the prestigious Field Marshal Lord Roberts. His 
book portrayed the German invasion of Britain and became an international best-
seller. Le Queux went on to write other books, notably Spies of the Kaiser in 1909, 
a particularly bad book 8. Soon, he confused the border between fact and fiction 
and it was little wonder why the Foreign Office and War Office did not take him 
seriously. 9 Consequently, he became an amateur spy-catcher himself. The anti-
German hysteria in Britain had of course been noticed in Berlin. In November 
1904, Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow told a British journalist: “[It seems] as if a 
certain school of your publicists looks upon a paper-war against Germany as the 
main object of its life 10.” Little wonder.
Readers of invasion novels reported to William Le Queux on the suspi-
cious activities and behaviour of German immigrants and tourists. The writer 
4.  Pierre Milza, Les relations internationales de 1871 à 1914 (Paris, Armand Colin, 2003), p. 72-76, p. 93-97 & 
p. 117-118.
5.  I. F. Clarke (ed.), h e Great War with Germany, 1890-1914; Fictions and Fantasies of the War-to-Come (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1997), p. 1-2.
6.  Tom Reiss, “Imagining the worst: How a literary genre anticipated the modern world”, in h e New Yorker, 
28/11/2005, p. 106-114.
7.  Clarke (ed.), h e Great War with Germany, 1890-1914, p. 2 & p. 5.
8.  Philip Knightley, h e Second Oldest Profession; Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 
2003) p. 17.
9.  Ibid., p. 12-13.
10.  Clarke (ed.), h e Great War with Germany 1890-1914, p. 17.
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was submerged by waves of letters and to his mind they confirmed the fact that 
Britain was indeed being currently infiltrated by spies, preparing the dreaded 
invasion. People were afraid of the large number of German waiters in the 
country, while others spotted Germans making sketches and taking photogra-
phs. German barbers and hotel owners on the east coast were equally suspects. 
One man wrote to the Morning Post that there were 90,000 German army 
reservists in Britain and that they had hidden very exactly 209,000 rounds of 
Mauser ammunition. Everything was ready for the invasion, he warned 11. But 
more importantly, little by little, owing to the pressure of public opinion and 
the press, the British government began to pay more attention to what Le 
Queux and company had to say. Although evidence of real German espionage 
in Britain was flimsy, the popular spy-craze eventually led to the creation of 
the Secret Service Bureau, later known as MI5 (domestic intelligence) and MI6 
(foreign intelligence) 12. At the end of the day, were there that many German 
spies in the United Kingdom or not? The answer is a resounding no. The 
British wrongly believed that not only German naval intelligence was operating 
in their country but also German military intelligence which was not the case. 
In fact, German military intelligence was focusing on France and Russia. The 
legendary spymaster Walter Nicolai later admitted that he would have targeted 
Britain but then the war broke out and it was too late to set up an efficient 
network 13.
Having said this, there was some evidence of German intrigue. Since 1906, 
there had been a secret correspondence between George Freeman, a man working 
for Clan na Gael (Irish-American republican organisation), and Theodor Schie-
mann, a German professor and private adviser to Kaiser Wilhelm II. Their cor-
respondence reveals that Freeman was sending information about Irish nationa-
lists in Ireland and in the United States. Freeman had also extensive contacts with 
Indian and Middle-Eastern nationalists, opposed to British rule. In 1907, Schie-
mann enquired into the number of Irishmen serving in the Royal Navy, the idea 
being obviously to figure out whether they could be relied upon to paralyse the 
navy in time of war against Germany. Freeman was not able to furnish an exact 
number. The British did not seem to be aware of this correspondence. However, 
they were aware of other contacts between the Germans and Irish republicans. 
In 1912, the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) learnt that the Irish Republi-
can Brotherhood (IRB) had sent an emissary to meet the German ambassador in 
London. A short time later, the DMP learnt that Clan na Gael was sending one 
11.  Knightley, h e Second Oldest Profession, p. 9-10, p. 16, p. 19 & p. 20.
12.  Christopher Andrew, h e Defence of the Realm; h e authorised history of MI5 (London, Allen Lane, 2009), 
p. 14-15, p. 17-18 & p. 25-26.
13.  Ibid., p. 52.
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of their men to Berlin 14. It would seem that the British did have some legitimate 
reasons for concern. So, not only literary fantasy was at the origin of the founding 
of the Secret Service Bureau but also real facts. But how had the invasion scare 
and spy fever affected Ireland?
The Irish had one major contribution to the invasion novels: The Riddle of 
the Sands written by Erskine Childers in 1903. Childers came from an Anglo-
Irish background and before he became the well-known Irish republican, he was 
a strong enthusiast of the British Empire. At the turn of the century, Childers 
became worried of a possible surprise invasion by Germany. Being a keen yachts-
man he set out to explore the Frisian Isles along the Dutch, German and Danish 
coastline. He built the following theory. Germany had a rather short coastline 
facing Britain and the North Sea which would force the Imperial Navy to sail 
through the narrow strait of Skagerrak between Denmark and Norway. As to the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, nowadays called Kiel Canal (since 1948) connecting the 
North Sea to the Baltic Sea, it was not yet deep and wide enough to allow batt-
leships to sail through. In other words, the German Imperial Navy would be like a 
predictable sitting duck for the Royal Navy.
Therefore, Childers imagined that the Imperial Navy could quietly slip 
through the Frisian Isles, on its way to England. The problem here was that the 
waters around the Frisian Isles were notoriously shallow, infested with sandbanks. 
This forms the plot of the book. Childers imagined that the Germans were able to 
build special boats adapted to navigation in both around the Frisian Isles and the 
North Sea. But two Englishmen, Arthur Davies and Charles Carruthers, stumble 
across the Germans’ dastardly plan and eventually foil it. The Riddle of the Sands 
is very technical with much attention paid to detail 15. And this is the main dif-
ference with all the other invasion authors. Childers’ book is widely regarded as 
the first modern thriller, a precursor of Frederick Forsythe, John Le Carré, Robert 
Ludlum and so on. In 1979, the book became a film of the same name by Tony 
Maylam. In 1987, there was a version for the German television called Das Rätsel 
der Sandbank (the mystery of the sandbank) by Rainer Boldt. In November 1903, 
the Irish Times (unionist) commented: “[…] the story, viewed from both points, 
whether that of politics or adventure, is an interesting and exciting one. Mr. Chil-
ders has a very facile pen, and will be heard of again 16.” Indeed.
The Riddle of the Sands was an instant success. Childers himself expressed the 
hope that “nobody will read into this story of adventure any intention of provo-
king feelings of hostility to Germany”. The main purpose of the book, he explai-
14.  Jérôme aan de Wiel, h e Irish Factor, 1899-1919; Ireland’s strategic and diplomatic importance for foreign powers 
(Dublin, Irish Academic Press, 2008), p. 48-49, p. 135-139 & p. 57-58.
15.  Erskine Childers, h e Riddle of the Sands (London, Penguin Books), i rst published in 1903.
16.  h e Irish Times, 07/11/1903.
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ned, “is to stimulate interest in a matter of vital importance to Great Britain”. It 
was above all meant as a warning. It did just that. The very same year, the Conser-
vative government of Prime Minister Arthur Balfour announced the setting up of 
a new Royal Navy base at Rosyth in Scotland 17.Winston Churchill admitted that 
The Riddle of the Sands was at the origin of the establishment of further bases at 
Invergordon, Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow 18. It looked pretty much as if Childers 
was playing his part in the current arms race between Britain and Germany. But 
then followed a rather bizarre episode, once again evidence that fact and fiction were 
blurred. In August, two British officers, Captain Trench and Lieutenant Brandon, 
were arrested by the Germans on the Frisian island of Borkum. They had been sent 
there by British naval intelligence 19. In December, they were put on trial in Leipzig 
and condemned to a prison sentence. It then transpired that Brandon had read The 
Riddle of the Sands not less than three times… Childers would later meet the two 
spies 20. Even Churchill drew his strategic inspiration from the book when the war 
broke out in August 1914. He was then First Lord of the admiralty and argued 
during a cabinet meeting that the Royal Navy should seize one of the Dutch Frisian 
islands. 21 It was never carried out and the chances were that if the Royal Navy had 
done so, it would have made sure that the neutral Dutch would have joined the 
Germans in the war. As to Childers, he went sailing again in the North Sea, near the 
Kiel Canal and in German territorial waters in the summer of 1913 but he felt that 
he was no longer welcome there 22. No wonder.
But what was the situation in Ireland? The reality was that Germany was badly 
known. Therefore, the image that people had of that country was rather vague 
and this facilitated the task of propagandists 23. While this is certainly correct, a 
survey of twelve Irish newspapers between 1890 and 1914 allows to state that 
invasion and spy scares were above all reported by the national press rather than 
by the regional press. For instance, the term “German invasion” is found 96 times 
in the Irish Times, 61 times in the Irish Independent and 33 times in the Free-
man’s Journal as opposed to 12 times in the Southern Star, 10 times in the Leitrim 
Observer and 9 times in the Anglo-Celt. The term “German spy” is reported 
105 times in the Irish Times, 34 times in the Irish Independent and 14 times in 
the Freeman’s Journal as opposed to 6 times in the Southern Star, 5 times in the 
Leitrim Observer and 3 times in the Connacht Tribune. Also of interest are the fol-
lowing facts. The Riddle of the Sands is mentioned only twice in the Irish Indepen-
17.  Clarke (ed.), h e Great War with Germany 1890-1914, p. 3 & p. 10.
18.  Knightley, h e Second Oldest Profession, p. 16.
19.  Andrew, h e Defence of the Realm, p. 32.
20.  Jim Ring, Erskine Childers: Author of the Riddle of the Sands (London: John Murray, 1997), p. 119 & p. 127.
21.  Ibid., p. 153. 
22.  Ibid., p. 131.
23.  Joachim Fischer, Das Deutschlandbild der Iren 1890-1939 (Heidelberg, Winter, 2000), p. 49.
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dent, once in the Sunday Independent and once in the Irish Times. The Invasion 
of 1910 is mentioned 6 times in the Irish Times, once only in the Anglo-Celt, the 
Connacht Tribune and the Meath Chronicle. However, William Le Queux is men-
tioned 109 times in the Irish Times, 20 times in the Irish Independent, twice in 
the Sunday Independent and once in the Meath Chronicle. His name also appears 
12  times in the Leitrim Observer although in advertisements for a new book of 
his, The Money Spider (about a mystery set in the Arctic) 24. Evidently, before the 
war, unlike what was happening in Britain, fear of Germany seems not to have 
been as virulent in Ireland simply because she had no quarrel with Germany but 
definitely had one with Britain about home rule.
The Irish press did however make some publicity for and offer literary criti-
cism of invasion novels. In October 1906, the Irish Independent commented on 
Ernest Oldmeadow’s The North Sea Bubble that it was “a remarkable book” 25. 
Perhaps had the newspaper been inspired by the fact that the decisive battle in 
Oldmeadow’s imagination takes place at the Shannon river in Ireland and which 
sees the ultimate defeat of the Germans by the Anglo-Irish army. Was it a subli-
minal message against home rule? The Irish Independent had also much good to 
say about Alan H. Burgoyne’s The War Inevitable published in 1908. This book 
depicts “a treacherous German invasion of England, secretly planned during the 
illness of the German Emperor”. Yet, the combined Anglo-Japanese forces even-
tually defeat the Teutonic invaders 26. But some Irish newspapers could be most 
critical of the mass hysteria that invasion scares had produced in Britain. Perhaps 
one of the most trenchant articles was published by the Anglo-Celt in March 
1909. It stated that the English people had worked itself into “a state of agitation” 
and severely, but also rightly accused the British press of spreading falsehoods on 
Germany and her Kaiser, particularly Lord Northcliffe’s newspapers: 
h e papers conducted by Lord Northclif e – Mr Harmsworth that 
was – raised the cry of a contemplated German invasion – the presence 
of 50,000 clerks, waiters and others of that Nationality in London alone 
giving a good foundation for the powers of the imaginative journalist. 
24.  Research carried out by search engine in the Irish Newspaper Archive, www.irishnewsarchive.com, and the 
digital archive of the Irish Times, www.irishtimes.com/search/archive.html (consulted on 02/02/2010). h e 
following newspapers were used: h e Freeman’s Journal, h e Irish Times, h e Irish Independent, h e Sunday 
Independent, h e Anglo-Celt, h e Connacht Tribune, h e Leitrim Observer, h e Munster Express, h e Nenagh 
Guardian, h e Southern Star, h e Meath Chronicle & h e Westmeath Examiner. It should be noted that the Cork 
Examiner and a main unionist newspaper from Ulster are not included. However, there is no much reason to 
believe that the i ndings would have been signii cantly dif erent if they had been included. h e time range used 
is from 1 January 1890 until 31 December 1914. Curiously, research in newspapers with the search engines 
does not always return the same results, but it remains largely relevant nonetheless.
25.  h e Irish Independent, 01/10/1906.
26.  Ibid., 16/11/1908.
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[…] h is sort of stuf  has resulted in a war-scare in England, the masses 
being genuinely apprehensive that at any moment the German l eet may 
batter their cities to ruins, and subject them to a hateful yoke 27.
The Anglo-Celt then opportunistically, but also realistically informed its readers 
that if war was on the cards between Britain and Germany, then the British 
government would do well to quickly satisfy Ireland’s home rule aspirations 28! The 
more extreme nationalist press, however, was taking sides with Imperial Germany. 
In 1905, the United Irishman declared: “It has been English policy to represent 
the German Emperor – in Ireland – as a shouting idiot – a policy helped by our 
imitative and slavish press. The German Emperor is an astute monarch, who has 
trumped every card which England has played against Germany in Africa, in 
South America, and in Europe.” In 1908, Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn 
Féin, praised the Kaiser’s foreign policy in Sinn Féin and approved of Berlin’s deci-
sion to increase naval expenditure 29.
Then, there were those Irishmen who did not like their tax money to be spent 
on the building of dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy. In March 1909, the Irish 
Times reported that at a meeting of the United Irish League (UIL) in Drogheda, 
it was suggested that if Ireland had home rule, she would be very glad to build 
a dreadnought for the Royal Navy, just like New Zealand was currently offering 
to do. But some UIL members did not agree. One believed that building navy 
ships was none of Ireland’s concern, only home rule was, and another said that 
the German invasion scare was “only a political fake, got up to force the [British] 
Liberal party to spend money 30”. In April, the Meath Chronicle wrote about the 
recent meeting of the Dunshauglin Board of Guardians that a Mr Fitzsimmons 
had put forward an amendment against the raising of additional taxes on Irish-
men which would serve to build more dreadnoughts, quick firing guns, sub-
marines and so on. He had added: “[…] As we are not afraid of any German 
invasion in this country, we refuse to be a party to any further suicidal taxation.” 
Fitzsimmons’s amendment was ruled out 31, but, as will be seen, he was not wrong.
Although, the German invasion and spy fever was definitely milder in Ireland, 
it did nonetheless enter the people’s psyche. In April 1909, the Freeman’s Journal 
reported that a German spy had been sighted at Kilmallock in County Limerick. 
He was never found, however 32. In November 1912, the Irish Independent repor-
ted that a suspicious man was seen camping near a fortified position in Galway. 
27.  h e Anglo-Celt, 20/03/1909.
28.  Ibid.
29.  aan de Wiel, h e Irish Factor, 1899-1919, p. 51-52.
30.  h e Irish Times, 25/03/1909.
31.  h e Meath Chronicle, 24/04/1909.
32.  h e Freeman’s Journal, 16/04/1909.
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He was arrested and it subsequently turned out that he was a Belgian tourist of 
a well-known family 33. The following year, still in Galway, the Connacht Tribune 
reported that a mysterious airship had been spotted by the inhabitants. The news-
paper recorded their reactions: “Many people were startled by the rumour, and 
drew highly imaginative pictures of a German invasion, evidently an echo of the 
recent airship scare in England 34.” Unsurprisingly, on occasion journalists used the 
invasion image in articles which had nothing to do with the actual subject. In 
May 1907, the Irish Times reported on rumours regarding the establishment of a 
shipping line between Liverpool and New York by the German shipping company 
Hamburg-America Line. It titled: “Liverpool and New York Trade; the German 
invasion 35.” It was the same story with the Irish Independent. In April 1909, it 
wrote about the threat that German trawlers posed to Ireland’s fisheries. The eye-
catching title of the article was “A German Invasion; Irish fisheries in peril 36”. 
Without a doubt, such titles could not have failed to influence some people’s opi-
nions and did much to increase their ill-defined fear of Germany.
Interestingly, some felt the urge to personally write to Kaiser Wilhelm II. In 
1907, somebody in England, very likely an Irishman or woman, sent him the fol-
lowing postcard: “To the German Emperor. Should you invade England in 1910, 
you will not harm the Catholic churches, will you? A happy Christmas 37! But in 
Ireland, there was a unique phenomenon as some among the nationalists but also 
unionists were ready to welcome a German invasion. In 1905, a Protestant woman 
urged the Kaiser to deliver Ireland [sic] from the tyranny of the organised Roman 
Catholic rule, now existing in the west of Ireland. […] In the name of God come 
over and deliver us. […] Why should not a German be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland! 
Amen 38.” This was the irony: on the one hand, there were unionist leaders who 
declared that they would prefer the Kaiser’s rule rather than nationalist Rome rule 
while on the other hand, advanced nationalists were thinking of an alliance with 
Germany to get rid of the British! In 1909, the Kilkenny People reported that Major 
John MacBride, an Irish republican who had fought with Boers against the British 
in South Africa, had said that in case the Germans invaded Britain he hoped that 
they would also send 100,000 rifles to Ireland for her liberation. In 1910, however, 
Thomas Andrews, a member of the Ulster Unionist Council, told the very pro-
Conservative Morning Post that he would “rather be governed by Germany than by 
Patrick Ford and John Redmond [home rule party leader] and Co 39”. The question 
33.  h e Irish Independent, 21/11/1912.
34.  h e Connacht Tribune, 29/03/1913.
35.  h e Irish Times, 28/05/1907.
36.  h e Irish Independent, 30/04/1909.
37.  aan de Wiel, h e Irish Factor, 1899-1919, p. 25.
38.  Ibid., p. 52.
39.  Ibid., p. 24 & p. 52.
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was: who would get Germany’s favour?! The answer seemed to be both. Indeed, 
in April 1914 the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) smuggled German arms into the 
country during a daring gun-running operation and it was followed by a gun-run-
ning operation of the Irish Volunteers the following July. The irony here was that it 
was Erskine Childers, by now a committed Irish nationalist, who transported the 
German rifles on his yacht 40! It could be said that his writing of The Riddle of the 
Sands had provided him with enough experience. Fiction was becoming fact.
It came as no surprise that all these pro-German declarations and gun-running 
activities began to seriously worry the authorities in Britain and Ireland. In April 
1910, the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) mounted a surveillance operation 
regarding a certain German professor called Krautwurst. Krautwurst had acqui-
red a house in Sandymount at 17 Strand Road. He had committed no crime but 
the problem was that his house was “a substantial dwelling facing the sea”… If you 
were foreign and came from Central Europe, the location of your home or place 
of work could become problematic. In January 1914, the Irish High Command 
took the decision to restrict the movements of a German national called Bessler who 
owned the Salthill Hotel in Monkstown simply because it was near the sea. From 
now on, Bessler needed a special permit to enter “the prohibited area of the county 
of Dublin” to visit his family. It was the same with an Austro-Hungarian natio-
nal called Spacek who was the manager of the Royal Marine Hotel in Kingstown 
(nowadays Dun Laoghaire) 41. In December 1913, the Royal Irish Constabulary 
(RIC) reported to Vernon Kell, the head of MO5 (called MI5 in January 1916), the 
whereabouts of a real German spy, Captain Kurd von Weller, who would be arrested 
in August 1914 42. But then, like in Britain, the barber conspiracy began. In Spies of 
the Kaiser, William Le Queux had written that one spy was a barber. This turned 
out to be a source of inspiration for Colonel James Edmonds of the British Secret 
Service, who kept an eye on two German hairdressers in Southsea, one of them, it 
“was discovered by accident” was wearing “a wig over his own thick head of hair 43”. 
Soon what would nowadays be termed a conspiracy theory blew over to Ireland.
In January 1914, the detectives of the DMP had noticed what were believed 
to be suspicious activities of two German hairdressers, Karl Schmutz and Ernest 
Heise. Schmutz had joined an Orange Order lodge in Dublin while Heise was 
in touch with Sinn Féin. In this case, it would seem that the police was rather 
justified in being intrigued. Indeed, why should two immigrants do so? The chief 
inspector of the DMP concluded pertinently: 
40.  Ibid., p. 69-72, p. 33-34 & p. 36-37.
41.  Ibid., p. 52 & p. 67-68.
42.  Andrew, h e Defence of the Realm, p. 875 (endnote 112).
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It is remarkable that Schmutz and Heise should be identii ed with 
two sections of Irishmen who would likely create extreme political strife; 
and from all the surroundings I respectfully suggest that it is reasonable 
to assume that the two men named are agents for and in the pay of the 
German Government 44.
It might be relevant to point out here that when the war broke out, 
22  German agents (real ones!) were immediately arrested and three of them, 
Karl Gustav Ernst, Frederick William Fowler and Otto Moritz Walter Kruger, 
were hairdressers 45. So, was there a barber conspiracy after all? It is quite clear 
that barber shops and restaurants located near naval bases for instance could be 
ideal spots to pick up information and gossip. It should also be mentioned that 
the Prussians did use some German immigrants in France to prepare their inva-
sion in 1870. Some of them were teachers, waiters and barbers. The British had 
concluded that the Prussians had used German army reservists in France. Besides, 
some German military reviews like the Militärwochenblatt, which the British read, 
had explained the need for saboteurs and spies 46. However, this did obviously not 
mean that every single hairdresser and waiter was a spy unlike what was believed.
But, in this long saga of fiction meeting fact, there was a twist, and a big one 
as it turned out. When Erskine Childers wrote The Riddle of the Sands in 1903, 
he was right to warn his readers about a possible invasion, but he got the enemy 
wrong: it was not the Germans but the French! Indeed, two boxes of docu-
ments in the French military archives near Paris reveal that some French officials 
seriously toyed with the idea of attacking Britain through Ireland at a time when 
the British army was away in distant South Africa (incidentally, there are no docu-
ments about a German invasion in the German military archives in Freiburg im 
Breisgau). Between 1900 and 1904, several French intelligence agents were sent 
to Ireland to explore the possibility of a landing. Ireland was of course a historic 
ally of France. The agents sent back very precise reports to the Deuxième Bureau 
(military intelligence) in Paris about topography, quality of the roads, British 
coastal defences, strength and morale of British troops, estimations of strength 
and quality of various nationalist and unionist organisations and so on. The 
agents had reached the conclusion that the southern coast in County Cork would 
be the best place to land. They were in touch with Irish republicans who gave 
them a detailed invasion plan in September 1902. Of course, for the republicans 
an attack on Britain through Ireland would lead to the liberation of their country, 
so they hoped. On occasion very precise questions were put by the French. For 
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instance, what would the Irish people do in the event of a joint Franco-Russian 
invasion? No names, be they French or Irish, were ever mentioned in the reports 
for the Deuxième Bureau. Security concerns were paramount and yet the German 
embassy in Paris got wind of rumours of a French invasion of Ireland and warned 
the Foreign Office in Berlin. The rumours, however, were wrongly dismissed.
But there was more. The British Special Branch had infiltrated Clan na Gael 
in the United States. In December 1900, one of its agents reported to London 
that John MacBride had arrived in New York by way of Paris. In a subsequent 
secret meeting, MacBride told John Devoy, the leader of Clan na Gael, and a 
few others that he had recently been “brought to see the leading Minister of the 
Government in Paris by a well known Deputy, and the question asked him by the 
Minister was, what would the Irish be prepared to do in say six months or when 
called upon in conjunction with [France] […]”. The identity of the two French-
men remains an enigma although hints would point to René Waldeck-Rousseau, 
the Prime Minister, and Lucien Millevoye, a French deputy who was the lover of 
MacBride’s wife, Maud Gonne, despite the fact that Waldeck-Rousseau was from 
the left and Millevoye from the far-right. The French, German and British sources 
all fit together like a jigsaw and there can be no doubt that some in Paris had 
indeed considered attacking Britain through Ireland. But it never materialised. In 
April 1904, France and Britain signed the Entente Cordiale, which also explained 
why Irish republicans turned towards Germany as a potential source of support. 
It is most relevant to notice that after the signing of the Entente Cordiale, French 
military intelligence immediately lost all interest in Ireland as the sudden lack of 
documents in the French military archives shows. It was the big hint that confir-
med the hard evidence that an invasion had indeed been seriously envisaged 47.
But with the big twist came a big irony. It was William Le Queux of all people 
who got the name of the plausible enemy right since in 1903, the very same year 
Childers published The Riddle of the Sands, he pointed the finger at France in his 
novel Secrets of the Foreign Office. If only his imagination had known how close 
to the truth he came! A final observation here. Professor Christopher Andrew, 
specialist in the history of espionage and author of a seminal study of MI5, has 
written that the leaders of the British Secret Services “had much better grounds 
for believing that there was a major German espionage offensive against Britain 
than most historians [including himself ] have been willing to recognize 48”. The 
French invasion episode definitely confirms Andrew’s view except that the British 
were looking across the North Sea and not the English Channel.
47.  Jérôme aan de Wiel, “h e French Invasion that never was: the Deuxième Bureau and the Irish Republicans, 1900-
4”, in Nathalie Genet-Roui  ac & David Murphy (eds.), Franco-Irish Military Connections, 1590-1945 (Dublin, 
Four Courts Press, 2009), p. 238-252 & aan de Wiel, h e Irish Factor, 1899-1919, p. 3-25 & p. 124-129.
48.  Andrew, h e Defence of the Realm, p. 10-11.
German Invasion and Spy Scares in Ireland and Britain…
orn 37
When the war eventually broke out in August 1914, spy fever reached unpre-
cedented heights of delusions in Britain. The facts are well known and do not 
need to be detailed here 49. The government at once passed drastic legislation to 
cope with spying. The Aliens Restriction Act allowed the authorities “to impose 
restrictions on aliens and make such provisions as appear necessary or expedient 
for carrying such restrictions into effect”. It was followed by the Defence of the 
Realm Act (DORA) which was almost the equivalent of martial law powers. 
Home Secretary Reginald McKenna did not manage to assuage the public’s obses-
sion despite the fact that the German spy network had already been smashed with 
the arrest of 22 spies. The British press was not convinced either by the efficiency 
of governmental measures 50. Ireland too was in the grip of war fever. Civil war 
between nationalists and unionists regarding home rule had been averted thanks 
to a last-minute compromise solution found by Herbert Asquith’s cabinet: home 
rule was put on the statute book and would be implemented after the war, which 
everybody believed would be short, and a solution would have to be found for 
Ulster. Nationalists and unionists went to war together, but republicans, Sinn 
Féin and the Irish Labour Party did not agree.
In August, the inspector-general of the RIC wrote: “All classes displayed a 
strong patriotic and anti-German feeling, and joined irrespective of creed and 
politics in giving a hearty send off to the Reservists when they left to join the 
Colours 51.” Recruitment figures were outstanding. Between 4 August 1914 and 
February 1915, about 50,107 Irishmen volunteered to fight in the British army 
and left for the trenches of France. The press was largely in favour of the war. 
The Cork Examiner published strategic maps to keep its readers posted 52. The 
Irish Times opined that a German invasion in the north of the country was unli-
kely, owing to the presence of the well-trained Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). 
Therefore, the southern and western coasts would be better options for them, but 
150,000 well-trained men could repulse them 53. The Irish Independent thought it 
judicious to re-advertise The Riddle of the Sands to explain the crisis 54. The Sunday 
Independent divulged that Erskine Childers was to serve with the Royal Navy in 
the North Sea and commented: “The author of The Riddle of the Sands, which, 
more than any other argument, was the cause of strengthening England’s naval 
power in the North Sea, will surely give us a great story when the great war is 
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at an end 55.” In this the Sunday Independent was seriously mistaken as Childers 
would devote his energy to Ireland’s struggle for independence.
As could have been easily predicted, spy fever took hold of the masses, far 
more than what had happened before the war. The Freeman’s Journal reported that 
in Ballina “two persons dressed in clerical garb were arrested […] and detained in 
a barrack” while outside a hostile mob had gathered. It turned out that the two 
men with strange accents were in fact Scottish priests 56! The Kerryman reported 
that local fishermen had been shot at by soldiers as their boat had approached a 
British naval base near Berehaven. One of them had been hit in the leg. Sketching 
had become a most dangerous activity. The Galway Pilot and Vindicator wrote 
that a man had been seen sketching near Nimo’s Pier in Galway. He was arrested 
on the spot but it later transpired that he was from Dublin. The Galway Express 
rightly commented: “It is rather unpleasant to be a stranger in Galway at present, 
especially if your physiognomy presents a cosmopolitan appearance 57.” The Irish 
Independent had a story about a young man who was seen cycling between Bray 
and Enniskerry. The police found it suspicious and arrested him. He was only an 
English tourist 58. The Meath Chronicle warned against German balloons, Zeppe-
lins, allegedly seen flying over Drogheda 59.
In Ireland, the Aliens Restriction Order applied too. The German community 
in the country was very small. The census of 1911 recorded 963 nationals 60, but 
some Germans and Austro-Hungarians were rounded up and interned although it 
remains difficult to give an exact figure. The Cork Examiner reported that nine men 
in Cork and seven in Limerick, including two women, were detained by the army. 
In Dublin, like in London, Liverpool, Manchester and elsewhere, angry crowds 
smashed windows of shops owned by Germans 61. In Britain, about 8,000 aliens 
faced police investigations but there was no proof whatsoever of an undercover 
German military network 62. The Irish Independent welcomed these tough measures 
on aliens. The newspaper was still convinced that a threat existed and considered 
it a chance to give jobs back to the Irish people and rid the country of foreigners: 
“One effect of this policy, which will, doubtless, be extended to Ireland, will be that 
Irish waiters, hairdressers, and other servants will have a better chance of securing 
employment at reasonable wages in their own country 63.”
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And so 1914 ended, on a very high note in favour of the war. But unlike in 
Britain, the invasion scare, spy fever and pro-war atmosphere in Ireland would 
not last. There were a variety of reasons for this. In a nutshell, the leader of the 
constitutional Nationalist Party, John Redmond, had many difficulties with the 
War Office in London which was slow in recognising and exploiting Irish patrio-
tism and the bravery of Irish soldiers at the front. Recruitment campaigns were 
badly organised and the anti-war nationalists and republicans began to mount an 
effective anti-war campaign. Anti-allied, especially anti-French propaganda spread 
in the country. Already by the summer of 1915, the inspector-general of the RIC 
noticed that recruitment figures were seriously dropping. Many farmers refused to 
enlist and enjoyed the current economic prosperity engendered by the war, a kind 
of a proto Celtic Tiger. People simply got on with their lives and a kind of politi-
cal apathy took hold of the masses. The Easter Rising of April 1916 and its conse-
quences made sure that recruitment remained moribund, and that the people 
took no longer much active interest in the war 64.
In conclusion, although there were invasion scares and spy fever in Ireland fuelled 
by a literature that gripped the people’s imagination, the situation was not as virulent 
as in Britain before the First World War. This was mainly due the different political 
climate as Irish nationalists were struggling for home rule. Not all of them perceived 
Germany as being the next enemy, the more advanced nationalists even thinking 
of a possible alliance with Berlin. The last point materialised during the war and its 
outcome was of course the Easter Rising in 1916. There was therefore a political coun-
terweight to invasion literature that was certainly far stronger than in Britain. The fol-
lowing example illustrates this. In 1909, Captain Guy du Maurier wrote a play entit-
led An Englishman’s Home about the German invasion of Britain. The play was a major 
success in London and was a message in favour of compulsory military service 65. But 
in Dublin, it seemed to have been a different story. The play was performed in the 
Theatre Royal and the Gaelic American, Clan na Gael’s newspaper, reported that when 
the German soldiers arrived on stage, the audience shouted: “You’re welcome, Boys!, 
Long live the Kaiser, Three Cheers for our Friends the Germans, Avenge the Concen-
tration Camps of South Africa [sic].” The German embassy in Washington was visibly 
impressed by this as it sent the Gaelic American’s article to Berlin for further analysis. 
The German Foreign Office underlined the relevant passages 66.
Also, the pro-home rule press, and not necessarily extremist newspapers, had 
correctly guessed that invasion novels served to increase Britain’s military budget. In 
fact, Admiral Jackie Fisher, the Royal Navy’s first sea lord, reflecting on the novels 
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said: “[They] served the double purpose of supplying false information to subserve 
expansion of armaments, and of increasing the ill-feeling which had already been 
worked up between England and Germany 67.” On 20 March 1909, the Anglo-Celt 
wrote a pertinent article entitled “A German Invasion” in which it denounced the 
British government’s opportunistic attitude and ridiculed the novels:
Some men succumb to l attery from a political opponent, and evi-
dently Mr. Haldane [Liberal secretary of state for war] is one of these. 
He fell in with [the Conservative and Unionist newspapers’] suggestions 
as to the new Territorial forces and they in return engaged capable nove-
lists to write realistic stories of the capture of England by the Germans 
within their walls, telling how on a certain Sunday night they cut the te-
legraph and telephone wires, took possession of a Dreadnought through 
the action of a German chef and attendants aboard, murdered the most 
prominent i nancier in England, captured the Prime Minister, rendered 
useless the ammunition intended for British troops and placed the capital 
of England under foreign rule 68.
There can be little doubt that a certain press in Britain and Germany prepared 
the public for war and therefore bore some responsibility in its eventual outbreak 
in August 1914. It must be noted here though that those who were in favour of 
more military expenditure in Britain were successful only to some extent. For ins-
tance, the idea of compulsory military service was not politically popular. Conscrip-
tion would only be introduced in Britain during the war at the beginning 1916 69. 
Ireland would then be left out because of political considerations. A last point of 
interest. After the Easter Rising, the British sent the 59th division to Ireland to 
control the country. In September 1916, it participated in military manoeuvres. 
The order of the division was: “Any German troops south of the Liffey [river near 
Dublin] are to be vigorously attacked.” It was an order that had little relation with 
reality as the battle of Jutland on 31 May 1916 had clearly demonstrated that the 
German navy would not break the blockade imposed by the Royal Navy in the 
North Sea. But as the French military attaché in London wrote much to his frustra-
tion: “No matter how unlikely the landing of important enemy forces with all their 
equipment is, there are, however, people, and serious people, who do not dismiss 
out of hand such a hypothesis 70.” Would it be exaggerated to suggest that The Riddle 
of the Sands and The Invasion of 1910 were still at work here?
67.  Knightley, h e Second Oldest Profession, p. 28.
68.  h e Anglo-Celt, 20/03/1909.
69.  Ferguson, h e Pity of War, p. 15-16, p. 102-104 & p. 198.
70.  aan de Wiel, h e Irish Factor, 1899-1919, p. 220-221. 
